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An Eclectic Approach to Turning
Points in Migration
Pang Eng Fong
National University of Singapore
The eclectic approach to migration transition presented in this article
emphasizes that a country’s net migration position evolves as it develops,
but in ways that reflect its initial economic and sociocultural conditions and
subsequent policies and economic progress. Not one but several turning
points exist, influenced by economic factors such as level of development,
wage differentials, and trade and investment ties, as well as social and
institutional factors such as a nation’s homogeneity and its migration
policies. To exemplify, the migration experiences of various Asia-Pacific
countries are compared.
Varieties of Migration Experiences
There is a wide variety of country experiences with migration and devel-
opment. A few countries like Australia and the United States developed
into multicultural societies as a result of successive waves of immigration
of skilled and unskilled people from many parts of the world.  While
foreign trade and investments have expanded the temporary outflow of
their nationals, these countries remain net gainers of people.  Other
countries, for example Germany and Italy, once saw a net outflow of people
to other countries.  But rapid economic growth has transformed them since
the 1960s into increasingly attractive places for foreigners seeking to
emigrate or work abroad. A third group of countries are important net
exporters of workers. They include many labor-abundant developing
countries that derive much remittance income from nationals working or
living abroad. Finally, there are countries that are neither significant
gainers nor losers in the international flow of people.  Many of them are at
a very low level of development, with little foreign trade and investment.
In the Asian  region, migration experiences have been almost as diverse
as those elsewhere. Two large countries — China and India — were
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historically large net senders of people to the Asian region as well as outside
the region. Out-migration from these two countries helped create the
ethnic mosaic in several Southeast Asian societies. Japan experienced
outflows of people to the Americas in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and did not attract a sizeable (and illegal) inflow of
unskilled labor into its homogeneous society until the late 1980s, more than
a decade after its economy had reached full employment. Taiwan’s expe-
rience is similar to that of Japan in one important aspect.  Though not a large
sender of labor abroad before its rapid industrialization, Taiwan became an
important destination for labor migrants in the late 1980s, a decade after the
onset of full employment and after its firms began shifting production to
Southeast Asia and China.  In the late 1980s, it attracted a return flow of its
people who had left in the 1960s and 1970s for further studies and had been
working abroad, especially in the United States. South Korea, another
ethnically homogeneous society, shares with Japan and Taiwan the char-
acteristics of being a late importer of unskilled (and illegal) labor from
neighboring China and other Asian countries.
The experience of Malaysia and Singapore stands in sharp contrast to
those of Japan, Taiwan and Korea. These two multiethnic societies at-
tracted unskilled foreign labor even before they achieved full employment.
Malaysia received a large (and mostly undocumented) inflow of foreign
workers into its agricultural and plantation sectors in the 1970s and 1980s
— before its economy ran short of unskilled labor, and while it was sending
thousands of workers abroad, mostly to Singapore. Singapore relaxed
policies on unskilled foreign labor in the late 1960s as it neared full
employment and before pressure on real wages built up. Today, foreign
labor, both skilled and unskilled, forms one-sixth of its workforce — the
highest proportion in Asia, with the exception of Brunei.
Other countries in the Asian  region are all net labor exporters, but the
economic impact of these outflows varies. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Pakistan  sent thousands of workers to the Middle East and East Asia in the
1970s and 1980s, but the contribution to economic development of return-
ing workers and remittances has been limited. In the Philippines, out-
migration, temporary as well as permanent, has been and remains impor-
tant to the economy. Remittances from labor exports are one of the
country’s largest foreign exchange earners.   A culture of emigration has led
to the development of sizeable Filipino immigrant communities in many
countries, notably the United States. Thailand, too, is a net labor exporter,
mainly to the Middle East in the early 1980s, but since the late 1980s
increasingly to the labor-short economies of East and Southeast Asia. Its
labor exports are, however, much smaller than those of the Philippines.
Unlike the Philippines where economic mismanagement has stunted
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growth and encouraged emigration and labor exports, Thailand is attract-
ing unskilled migrant workers from its neighbors, namely, Myanmar,
Cambodia and Vietnam, thanks to rapid growth brought about by policies
that promote foreign investments and ensure macroeconomic stability.
Explaining Migration Transition
The great variety of migration experiences among countries presents
problems for analysts wishing to build a useful explanatory model of
migration transition, namely, how and at what speed a country moves
from being a net labor sender to a net labor receiver.  A simple model would
look at the relative pecuniary and nonpecuniary attractiveness of countries
to potential migrants. Fields (1994), for example, has developed a con-
strained choice framework in which net migration is a function of real
wages in sending and receiving countries, employment opportunities in
sending and receiving countries, and nonpecuniary attractiveness in send-
ing and receiving countries.  A country would experience an outflow of its
nationals if the economic and non-economic rewards of moving outweigh
the expected gains from staying home. These rewards become relatively
less appealing as a country develops and offers more opportunities to its
nationals. By creating more jobs than can be filled by locals, economic
development makes the country more attractive to foreign job seekers,
even as the country’s firms shift production abroad and resort to more
labor-saving technologies. According to Fields, it is employment and
output expansion based on a labor-intensive, export-led industrialization
strategy that explains and quickens the migration transition in the newly-
industrialized economies (NIEs) of Asia. Countries that follow this strat-
egy successfully can expect to make this transition. Fields’ framework
focuses on the critical motivating factors that influence a country’s net flow
of people. But it deals only indirectly with the impact of trade and
investments on migration, and says little about the speed of the migration
transition and less about the role of information and uncertainty in
migration decisions.  More important, it leaves out institutional, political,
economy and policy factors that may delay or hasten the migration
transition. This paper  proposes an eclectic approach to turning points in
migration. It outlines a structure to analyze the economic, policy and
institutional influences on a country’s migration transitions in the course
of economic development. As will become clear, the structure identifies not
one but several  turning points in a country’s migration experience, and
draws attention to the particular experiences of countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.
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An Eclectic Approach  to Turning Points in Migration
The approach taken here assumes that a country undergoes migration
transitions in the course of its economic development. When and how
quickly it makes these transitions is the outcome of the complex interac-
tions of economic, institutional and policy variables that affect the propen-
sity of people to migrate or to remain in the country. Since migration is to
a large extent an economic decision, economic variables — employment
opportunities in destination countries, real wage differences between
sending and receiving countries, the cost of moving to the destination
countries, etc. — have powerful effects on migration decisions. These
effects, however, do not take place in a social vacuum, but are shaped by
institutional and policy factors, factors that help explain the rich diversity
of migration experiences among countries.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between a country’s net migration
position and its development level. The country’s level of economic
development is on the x axis. The y axis indicates the net stock of migrant
workers expressed as a percentage of the country’s labor force. If the net
inflow/outflow of migrant workers grows faster than the country’s labor
force, there would be an increase/decrease in the country’s relative
migration position. At very  low levels of development, a country neither
sends nor receives significant numbers of migrant workers. Its net migra-
tion position is effectively close to zero.  Its trade  and investment ties with
other countries are weak.  Potential migrants have little knowledge of and
are highly uncertain about employment opportunities abroad. Also being
very poor, they do not have the financial means to venture abroad in search
of employment. At the same time,  the country’s low real wage level and
general labor abundance make it unattractive to migrant workers from
most countries. However, if its immediate geographic neighbors are
equally  poor or poorer, it may attract a small crossborder flow of workers
from them. The reported presence of undocumented Vietnamese workers
on construction sites in Laos is one example of migration of people from one
very low income country to another in response to differential employment
opportunities.
As a country’s per capita income rises (as a result of increasing
agricultural productivity and the expansion of industrial and service
activities) and its trade and information links with the rest of the world
expand, there is likely to be an increase in the country’s net outflow of
people. Because it is still in the early stages of development and has an
abundance of labor, its domestic wage level is low. It is not seen as an
attractive destination by migrant workers. On the other hand, overseas
work becomes more attractive because of two developments. First, the











growth in per capita income (arising partly from the greater availability of
wage employment) raises the savings rate. This rise in the savings rate
expands the resources families can mobilize to send more members to seek
work in foreign lands. Second, the cost of information and uncertainty
declines as potential migrants learn from the experience and exploit the
social networks established by earlier  migrants. If the government  launches
a program of labor exports during this early phase of development, the
quickening of net labor outflows would be reinforced, as the experience of
many Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s suggests.  During this period
when the country has few institutions to produce skilled manpower, most
of the people leaving for overseas employment or to settle temporarily
elsewhere would be unskilled. Their out-migration does not greatly im-
prove the country’s serious unemployment and underemployment prob-
lem which arises because labor force growth outstrips the expansion in job
opportunities. While it may attract a few migrants from  poorer neighboring
areas, this inflow is very small relative to the size of the domestic labor
force.
At some point, however, the rate of increase in the net outflow of
workers slows down,  not because of a rising surge of migrant workers
from other countries, but because the net attractions of staying home
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at home, though still not enough to wipe out the backlog of unemployed
workers.  Also, there is a diminution in the pool of self-selected people most
eager to move or work abroad.  During this early phase of industrialization,
economic expansion encourages more people to enter the labor force,
people that had previously been discouraged from seeking work because
of the poor job market. This increase, however, is still smaller than the net
outflow rate, and so the proportion of net out-migrants in the labor force
continues to rise. Eventually the rate of net outflow slows to match the rate
of labor force growth.  At this point (p in Figure 1), the country reaches the
first turning point in its migration profile. When it reaches this turning
point in its development history, and how large the proportion of net
migrants to the labor force at this point would depend on many factors
including the country’s population size, the rate of job creation, and the
historical timing of its labor export surge. The larger the country’s popu-
lation and labor force, the greater the problems it would face in sending
labor abroad after a while.  Large countries like China, India and Indonesia,
for example, would very quickly run into resistance from receiving coun-
tries if they embark on an aggressive program of labor exports.  The faster
the country is able to create jobs, the more likely it is to draw women into
the workforce. As working women bear fewer children, fertility would
decline, slowing, with a lag, labor force growth. Early exporters of foreign
workers like the Philippines, for example, are likely to take longer to reach
this first turning point.  Being early entrants in the migration market, they
have stronger links to receiving countries and more extensive information
networks, and so can maintain a high rate of labor exports longer.  Their
longer dependence on labor migration as a source of foreign exchange may
also weaken their incentive to pursue growth-enhancing and job-creating
policies.
In theory, the first turning point could peak at 100 percent on the x axis
— that is, at a point where the net outflow is equal to the labor force.  This
level of net outflow is of course most unlikely as it would imply a complete
exhaustion of a country’s workforce and the total absence of any inflow of
workers. For most net labor-sending countries, the first turning point is
likely to be much lower.
After the first turning point, the country’s net outflow of workers
expressed as a proportion of its domestic workforce declines, at first, at an
increasing rate, and then as it approaches the second turning point, at a
decreasing rate.  This happens because the net labor outflow is increasing
at a slower pace than the labor force which is still expanding because of the
delayed effect of high population growth and rising labor force participa-
tion associated with the increasing inflow of women into the labor market.
As the country industrializes further, there may be a return flow of its
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nationals working abroad, and the country itself becomes more attractive
to foreign workers. Its expanding trade and investment ties lead to an
inflow of skilled people while the expansion of job opportunities draws
workers from other countries.  As the country moves towards a balance in
its labor inflow and outflow (point q in Figure 1), there are noticeable
changes in people’s values and attitudes towards work — changes that lead
rapidly to sectoral labor shortages.  There is greater reluctance among
locals to take up “dirty, dangerous, and difficult” or 3D jobs, and this
development could occur even before the country reaches full employ-
ment. Construction and agriculture are the two sectors that are quickly
shunned by locals.
Because of labor market imperfections and immobility, the appearance
of sectoral labor shortages does not necessarily signal full employment.
Nor does it necessarily lead immediately to a huge net inflow of foreign
workers.  Much depends on the characteristics and policies of the country.
For ethnically heterogeneous and immigrant countries like Malaysia for
example, the transition from being a net sender to a net receiver can be swift
and may precede the appearance of full employment.  For these countries,
points q and r in Figure 1 are one and the same. (Though never a net sender
because of its immigrant origins, Singapore began to be a net receiver of
foreign labor several years before it reached full employment in the early
1970s.  In this respect its experience is similar to Malaysia’s.1) But for
ethnically homogeneous societies like Japan, Korea and Taiwan, points q
and r are different.  These countries achieved full employment — Japan in
the early 1970s, Korea and Taiwan in the late 1970s — long before they
became net receivers of foreign labor.  They adjusted to general and sectoral
labor shortages, mainly though upgrading, but also by tolerating inefficien-
cies in certain sectors including agriculture.  Also, as homogeneous socie-
ties, they were less willing to consider labor importation as a first solution
to their labor problems. This unwillingness together with the greater
adjustment costs they present to would-be migrant workers meant they
could maintain their net zero migration position for a number of years.
Once a country approaches the net zero migration position which may
precede or follow the attainment of full employment by a few years, it
comes under increasing pressure from labor-short employers to allow legal
access to unskilled foreign labor. If it opens its door to foreign labor, as
Singapore did from the late 1960s, the result is a rapidly rising dependence
on foreign labor.  In 1980, the proportion of foreign workers in Singapore’s
workforce was 12 percent. A decade later, despite rising levies on their
1 For details of the experience of Malaysia and Singapore with foreign workers, see Pang
(1992) and Pillai (1992).
88 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL
importation, industrial upgrading, and the relocation of Singapore-based
enterprises to neighboring countries, this proportion had risen to 16
percent.
If the country forbids its employers from hiring foreign workers
legally, the result is an influx of illegal foreign workers, and mounting
pressure to regularize or legalize their importation.  In the case of Japan and
Taiwan (and less so in the case of South Korea), the large influx of foreign
workers, mostly from Asia since the late 1980s, was associated with the
expansion of these countries’ trade and investment ties in the Asia-Pacific
region.  It is no coincidence that a significant number of illegal workers who
entered Taiwan and Japan from the late 1980s were from Malaysia and
Thailand. The Philippines, in contrast to Malaysia and Thailand, attracted
much less investment from East Asia, but its long experience in exporting
contract labor explains the large number of Filipinos who left to seek work
in Japan and Taiwan.
In theory, a country’s net stock of foreign workers could be larger than
its domestic labor force. In reality, very high levels of dependence are,
however, rare, except in atypical countries with very small populations like
Brunei and Kuwait. Among Asian countries, Brunei probably has the
greatest net dependence — foreign workers there represent about 40
percent of its domestic workforce.
The rise in the net stock of foreign workers in a country, however,
cannot continue indefinitely.  As Figure 1 suggests, it will peak eventually,
but at a level that varies from one country to another.  At the peak, the net
inflow would be the same as the domestic labor force growth (which at this
stage of a country’s industrialization is likely to be growing at about 1
percent a year). The turning point (s in Figure 1) occurs as a consequence
of several developments. First, there is an increased outflow of mostly
skilled people to other countries where the country’s firms have invested
or relocated their operations. Second, the country’s firms are forced to
upgrade or relocate, mostly for competitive reasons, but also partly in
response to the growing problems of training and managing foreign labor.
These adjustments soften the demand for foreign labor. Third, in some
countries, Singapore and Malaysia, for example, the absorption of some
qualified foreign workers as permanent residents or citizens diminishes
the pool of foreign workers.
Because of their long experience in assimilating immigrants, countries
with heterogeneous populations are more likely than countries with
homogeneous populations to accept a higher proportion of foreign work-
ers in their midst.  They are therefore more likely to show a higher peak in
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the course of their development.  Malaysia has a net inflow of foreign
workers that amounts to 12 percent of its domestic workforce.2   Singa-
pore’s proportion is about 14 percent.3   Neither country can be said to have
reached its peak in net labor inflow, though Singapore may be close to it
because the shift of labor-intensive industries to neighboring countries and
rising levies on foreign labor have reduced the demand for foreign labor.
In contrast, the proportion of net inflow of foreign workers to the domestic
labor force averages less than 2 percent in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
But in these countries there are already serious concerns about the adverse
economic, social and cultural impact of a numerically large and rapidly
growing pool of unskilled foreign workers who are visibly concentrated in
a few industries and areas of the country.  As late net importers of labor,
these countries have been the targets of a highly developed recruitment
industry that has acquired considerable experience in organizing the
export of labor, legal as well as undocumented, to labor-deficient countries.
The experience of Asian countries suggests that the peak rate of net
inflow of foreign workers (expressed as a proportion of the domestic labor
force) does not have to occur at the same level of development for all
countries. Japan’s growing attraction to foreign labor developed only after
1985 following the large-scale relocation of Japanese factories to Southeast
Asia and when its per capita income was three to four times that of Taiwan
and South Korea whose rising dependence on foreign labor occurred
during the same period. Singapore’s relative dependence on foreign labor
surpassed that of the East Asian countries today more than two decades
ago when its per capita income was less than US$3,000.
After a country reaches its peak as a net labor receiver, its position on
migration may develop in three different ways depending on a variety of
circumstances and policies. First, net inflow as a proportion of the domestic
labor force could level off (Path A after point s in Figure 1), which means
a continuing absolute increase in the net number of foreign workers as the
domestic labor force is still growing, albeit at a slow rate. This levelling
could be the result of policies setting limits on the rate of migrant inflow.
If absolute limits on foreign workers are set (and enforced), the ratio of net
inflow of migrant workers to the domestic labor force will decline.  This
2 Pillai (1992) estimates that there were as many as one million foreign workers in Malaysia’s
workforce of 6.7 million in 1990.  Total outflow of Malaysian workers to other countries was
probably less than 200,000.
3 There were some 300,000 foreigners in Singapore in 1990.  This number includes an
estimated 50,000 dependents of foreign workers and students.  About 50,000 Singaporeans
were estimated to be living or working abroad.  The net inflow of foreign workers therefore was
about 200,000 which constitutes 14 percent of the island’s workforce of 1.5 million in 1990.
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decline would be steeper if a rising outflow of managers and professionals
accompanies the country’s growing outward investments.
Second, the net inflow of migrant workers could rise at a lower rate
than the expansion of the labor force. The outcome is reduced net depend-
ence on foreign labor. This dependence would conceivably level off,
leaving the country  with a lower but stable relative reliance on foreign
workers. At point t and beyond, the rate of labor force growth would equal
that of the net labor inflow. The country would then follow Path B in
Figure 1.
Third, the net inflow of migrant workers could continue to increase at
a lower rate than the labor force beyond point t.  As a result, the country’s
net dependence declines further. Eventually, it could end up with a zero net
migration position in which its stock of mostly skilled workers employed
abroad is balanced by the stock of skilled and unskilled foreign workers in
the country. Such  a country could take Path C after the point t in Figure 1.
Which path will a country follow after it reaches its peak level of net
labor inflow? The experience of most Asian countries as labor receivers is
short and provides no firm basis for extrapolation. Nevertheless, it is clear
from their experience that limiting the proportion of foreign workers in the
domestic labor force is a major economic and political challenge.  None has
succeeded in reducing the absolute net inflow of migrants, legal or illegal.
As fast economic growth is a major factor in their deepening dependence
on foreign workers, it would take a recession to cut the demand for foreign
workers.  But this is a solution devoutly not to be wished on countries in
the region.  Singapore’s dependence on foreign labor fell steeply during the
1985-1986 recession, but the fall was not what the government or its people
welcomed.
Relocation and upgrading can slow the demand for foreign labor, but
they are less easily applied to non-traded sectors, particularly construction,
retail trade, hotels, etc. Increasing the outflow of skilled workers would
reduce the proportion of net migrants in the labor force. While it would
increase earnings from labor exports, it would not address the problems
associated with a rising number of foreign workers in the country.
Conclusions
The eclectic approach to turning points in migration emphasizes that a
country’s net migration position evolves as it develops, but in ways that
reflect its initial economic and sociocultural conditions and subsequent
policies and economic progress. It suggests that the more homogeneous the
country, the slower it is to welcome unskilled foreign labor and the lower
the maximum level of foreign workers it is prepared to tolerate.
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Not every country has to traverse the same path from a net labor sender
to a net labor receiver. It does not even have to begin as a labor sender, as
Singapore’s experience suggests. Like Australia and the United States,
Singapore as an immigrant country was from its colonial days a net labor
receiver. It began to import labor, as did Malaysia beginning in the 1970s,
before it enjoyed full employment and rapid increases in real wages.
The time a country takes to move from being a net sender to a net
receiver of labor varies greatly. With the emergence of an international
recruitment industry, and faster information flows, a rapidly growing
economy is likely to attract migrant workers quickly, probably even long
before it experiences widespread labor shortages. The experience of Thai-
land is a case in point.  Thailand is already attracting many illegal workers
from neighboring Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Trade and
investment ties have played an important role in increasing the attractive-
ness of fast-growing countries in the Asia-Pacific region to potential
migrants. By expanding the flow of skilled people in the region, they have
added to the region’s economic dynamism which is the fundamental cause
of the turning points in migration among countries in the region.
Finally, comparable cross-country data on foreign labor inflows and
outflows are needed to test the eclectic approach to turning points and
examine its policy implications.  In the absence of such data, countries will
also find it increasingly difficult to develop policies that maximize the net
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